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Abstract 
The classical economists usually regarded rent in their analyses as a share of the gross product 
obtained from the use of land or a mine, which was indeed the way in which rent was treated in 
bargaining between landowner and tenant. The paper revives this view of rent, proceeding from its 
historical basis through Smith’s analysis to arrive at Sraffa’s equations, and also examines the case 
of the introduction of a tax conceived as a tithe, to which Sraffa referred very briefly (Sraffa 1960, 
p. 55). 
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1.	  Introduction 
 
In addressing rent, the French Physiocrats and the British classical economists usually regarded it as 
a certain share of the harvest, in the case of land, or the ore extracted, in the case of mines.1 It was 
only in connection with some specific points, generally concerning the effects of competition 
amongst landowners or tenant-farmers, that the rate of rent, understood as the rent per unit of land 
(acre), was taken into consideration.2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* The author is most grateful to Christian Gehrke and Neri Salvadori for their reading of the paper and the useful 
comments made. Thanks are also due to the participants of the conference ‘New Developments on Ricardo and the 
Ricardian Tradition’ (Lyon, September 2013). The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 It can also be pointed out that the rate of rent understood as the rent per acre usually makes little sense in the case of 
mines. While agricultural production employs the soil, ore extraction usually involves the subsoil, and output therefore 
depends in this case on the depth bored rather than the surface cultivated. 2	  See	  for	  example	  the	  following	  observation	  by	  Marx	  in his criticism of Rodbertus: ‘[Rodbertus] commits the mistake 
of dealing with the ratio of the money rent to a quantitatively limited piece of land, for instance to an acre, as though it 
had been the general assumption of classic economics in its analysis of the rise or fall of rent. This, again, is wrong. 
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The view of rent as a share of product gradually disappeared from economic theory with the 
passing of time. This was mainly due to the advent of the marginalist theory with its concept of 
distribution variables as the prices of the factors of production to be determined simultaneously.3 
This paper seeks to go back to the classical economists and revive the old way of considering 
rent. With a view to understanding why rent was treated as a share of product, the following section 
presents a brief overview of the historical evolution of forms of land tenure in Europe and argues, in 
a nutshell, that the idea of rent as a share of the harvest is a legacy of feudal times that persisted 
(and perhaps still does) in the capitalist system as a sort of crystallised custom or practice. Section 3 
then discusses some actual cases, taken from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, with rent seen as a 
share of the gross product of land or mines, which also provides an opportunity to address some 
issues possibly connected with this approach to rent. 
The last two sections are theoretical in nature. Section 4 focuses in particular on one of the least 
known and analysed passages of Sraffa’s Production of Commodities, where he considers the 
effects of the introduction of a tax conceived as tithe, i.e. as a share of the gross production of a 
certain commodity. In addition to discussing Sraffa’s assertions in this connection, it takes the 
opportunity to insert a tax or a rent, which is ultimately the same, conceived as a share of output 
into the framework of Sraffa’s equations. This operation is then extended and completed in section 
5. 
 	  
2. Historical basis 
 
Land rent was the prevailing form of surplus value in European pre-capitalistic societies under the 
feudal system. During that period, as reported amongst others by Adam Smith (1976, vol. 2, p. 200, 
I.xi.e.17) and Marx (1909, vol. 3, ch. XLVII), rents were paid in kind. According to Marx’s 
reconstruction, there was an initial phase in which land rent was paid in labour by means of a 
corvée system whereby farmhands worked unpaid on the feudal lord’s estate for part of the week in 
return for permission to produce their own subsistence, on other land also belonging to the lord, 
during the rest of it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Classic economics always treats the rate of rent, so far as it considers rent in its natural form, with reference to the 
product.’ Marx 1909, vol. 3, p. 904, note. 
3 While it is always possible to address rent, analytically, in a form other than the one in which it is actually observed, 
which means that the theory can focus on rates of rent understood as value rent per acre even though rent is actually set 
in terms of shares, there should be a precise reason (or indeed necessity) for doing so. 
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When society reached a higher state of civilisation (Marx 1909, vol. 3, p. 923), the feudal lord 
left the burden of organising production to the workers and, as a result, rent in labour was 
transformed into a rent in commodities paid with a share of product. 
Subsequently, with the increasing development of trade and hence the possibility of establishing 
the market value of the crop, rent in kind turned into rent in money. This led to a radical social 
change. To some rudimentary degree at least, farmers became entrepreneurs, no longer merely 
producers but also sellers. Moreover, as Marx remarked, this was one of the steps toward the rise of 
a new social system: 
 
[t]he transformation of rent in kind into money rent is not only necessarily accompanied, but even 
anticipated by the formation of a class of propertyless day laborers, who hire themselves out for 
wages. During the period of their rise, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom 
necessarily develops among the better situated tributary farmers of exploiting agricultural laborers for 
their own account, just as the wealthier serfs in feudal times used to employ serfs for their own 
benefit. In this way they gradually acquire the ability to accumulate a certain amount of wealth and to 
transform themselves even into future capitalists. [1909, vol. 3, p. 928] 
 
During this phase of transition, sharecropping – also known as the métayage system – was the 
typical form of land tenure, especially in continental European countries.4 As is known, this is a still 
pre-capitalistic form of land tenure in which the sharecropper or métayer undertakes the farming, 
primarily with his own labour and that of his family, and shares the produce with the owner of the 
soil. While the rent was usually half of the crop, a broad variety of different agreements were 
actually in use in different countries and periods.5 
Similarly, there were different agreements as to the responsibility for furnishing the means of 
production employed together with land and labour. It was, however, common practice for the 
landowner to provide the initial seed and livestock6 and the sharecropper the tools, which were 
usually made during the winter, when there was less to do in the fields. 
Though typically associated with the feudal period, this form of land tenure persisted for a long 
time in the capitalist system too7 side by side with tenancy, the new form of agricultural contract. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  As John Stuart Mill wrote, ‘[t]he metayer system has met with no mercy from English authorities’ (1909, p. 183). 
After developing an in-depth analysis of experience in France and Italy, however, he then drew this conclusion: ‘the 
unmeasured vituperation lavished upon the system by English writers, is grounded on an extremely narrow view of the 
subject’ (pp. 191, 2). 
5 While this point is addressed in greater detail in the following section, where Adam Smith’s observations on rent are 
considered, it can be briefly recalled here that, according to John Stuart Mill (1909, p. 183), the rent was up to two-
thirds of the product in many parts of Italy. Moreover, there were different possible arrangements for the payment of 
taxes and retention of stock. 
6 As a result of this provision in advance, Marx says that ‘the landlord claims his share not exclusively in his capacity as 
the owner of the land, but also as a lender of capital’ (1909, vol. 3, p. 933). 7	   The dissolution of the feudal system was, however, an extremely gradual process and did not take place 
simultaneously in every country. For example, Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations that sharecropping had been 
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France for example, according to Turgot, sharecropping and tenancy were the most widespread 
forms of land tenure during the last decades of the ancien régime,8 being more common 
respectively in poorer and richer areas (Turgot, [1770], p.25). 
A similar view can be found in Quesnay’s entry ‘Fermiers’ for the Éncyclopédie (1756,7), where 
he tried to foster the spread of tenancy by proclaiming its superiority with respect to the 
sharecropping system that still predominated in France at the time. The capitalist tenant-farmer, he 
claimed, can obtain more produce from land and, in so doing, benefits not only himself but also the 
landowner and the kingdom as a whole. This greater productivity of land is due, in his view, to the 
more appropriate means of production that tenant farmers can afford to employ because of their 
capital. Quesnay dwells in particular upon the advantage arising from the use of draught horses, 
which the sharecropper cannot afford, instead of oxen. Moreover, while the sharecropper tills the 
soil mainly by means of his own labour and that of his family, the tenant farmer employs wage-
earning farmhands of an age and strength more suitable to agricultural work. 
The coexistence of sharecroppers and tenant farmers is therefore a matter of fact, lasting only a 
short time in countries like Great Britain, where the capitalist system arrived more quickly, and a 
long time in others like France, where the dissolution of the feudal system was a very gradual 
process. In Italy in particular, the signing of new sharecropping contracts under the mezzadria 
system was not prohibited until 1974. It then became possible in 1982 for sharecroppers to 
transform their contracts into leaseholds even without the landowner’s agreement. 
It was therefore completely normal and natural in Europe during the 18th and 19th century to 
view rent as a share of gross product or its value. Landowners certainly understood rent in these 
terms, both because they were accustomed to this view and because, as Torrens wrote, they ‘might 
(and in point of fact frequently have done so) require to be paid for the use of the soil, not a fixed 
sum in money per acre, but a fixed proportion of the whole produce’ (1827, p. 231). In the case of 
tenancy contracts too, in setting the terms of the lease, rent was thus conceived as a share of product 
or as the market value of a share of what was supposed to be the average or normal yield of the land 
in question. 
Nowadays too, however, there appear to be important cases in which rent is conceived as a share 
of output. As Ravagnani (2008) points out with reference to royalties for oil extraction, 
‘negotiations over royalties have been regulated throughout the existence of the US oil industry by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in disuse in England for so long that he was forced to use the French term “metayer” because he did not know the 
English word for it (Smith 1976, vol. 2, p. 389 – III.ii.11). 8	  Adam Smith wrote that in France in his day, ‘five parts out of six of the whole kingdom’ were occupied by metayers 
(Smith 1976, vol. 2, p. 391 – III.ii.13). 
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conventional arrangements entitling landowners to a pre-established share of the oil extracted, or of 
its value’ (pp. 86, 87). 
 
 
3. Rent as a share of product in classical economics 
 
As seen in the previous section, there was in Europe, and indeed elsewhere too, a long period 
during which both landowners and tenants treated rent as a share of product in their bargaining. It is 
therefore not at all surprising that the classical economists, who lived and made their observations 
at that time, usually considered rent in their analyses as a fraction or share of the gross product of 
land (or its value). 
Even though this view of rent can be found in the writings of almost every economist directly or 
indirectly linked to the classical tradition,9 attention will be focused in this section on some 
passages from Adam Smith, whose Wealth of Nations provides all the cases required for a complete 
treatment of rent as a share of product. 
As stated above, while the share of rent was usually half the produce in the French métayage and 
Italian mezzadria systems, a variety of different agreements was possible. In particular, it is evident 
that areas of lands suited and indeed devoted to different uses will generally differ in terms of their 
rent shares. The fraction of product obtained by the landowner for the use of agricultural soil is in 
fact generally different from the share earned as royalties by the owner of a mine, and further 
differences can arise with the extraction of different kinds of minerals (coal, tin, lead, oil, etc.). 
Adam Smith thus observes that a share considered normal for agricultural production would be 
considered excessive for a coal mine: 
 
[t]he rent of an estate above ground commonly amounts to what is supposed to be a third of the gross 
produce […]. In coal-mines a fifth of the gross produce is a very great rent; a tenth the common rent 
[Smith 1976, vol. 2, p. 184 – I.xi.c20]. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 While a whole series of quotations from Malthus, Ricardo, Torrens, J.S. Mill and others could be presented, it would 
never be complete, no matter how long, because this was the way in which economists thought about rent, explicitly or 
implicitly. Even those who rigidly adopted the differential theory of rent (and chiefly considered agricultural rents) 
could not avoid referring to rent as a share of production despite the fact that this was not fully consistent with (or at 
least required by) their theory. It is, however, our belief that the differential theory of rent could be reformulated in 
terms of shares, as discussed at the end of section 6. 
  As regards Ricardo in particular, many passages of his Principles refer to rent as a share: sometimes as a share of the 
harvest of a certain agricultural product – e.g. where it is described as a ‘proportion of the produce, obtained with a 
given capital on any given farm’ (1951-73, vol. 1, p. 83) – and sometimes as the share of the whole national product 
paid to landlords (cf. 1951-73, vol. 1, p. 402; see also Cannan, 1903, pp. 352, 3). He did, however, perceive a possible 
contradiction with the theory of differential rent, as shown by this deleted passage from his Notes on Malthus: ‘[r]ent is 
not a proportion of the produce obtained [...] depending as it does on the difference between the quantity of produce 
obtained by two equal capitals’ (1951-73, vol. 2, 196, footnote). For this passage, see also Gehrke (2013). 
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Moreover, there is generally a difference in the share of product that constitutes the rent in coal 
mining as against tin mining: 
 
[a] sixth part of the gross produce may be reckoned the average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, the 
most fertile that are known in the world, as we are told by the Reverend Mr. Borlace, vice-warden of 
the stannaries. Some, he says, afford more, and some do not afford so much. A sixth part of the gross 
produce is the rent, too, of several very fertile lead mines in Scotland [p. 186 – I.xi.c24]. 
 
In Smith’s day, to sum up, the standard rent was thus a third of product for farming agricultural 
soil, a tenth for a coal mine and a sixth for tin and lead mines. There is, however, a point still to be 
clarified. While coal is the only output to be obtained from a coal mine (and tin and lead are 
respectively the sole physical outputs of tin and lead mines), a whole variety of crops can be grown 
on agricultural land. How can we deal with this fact? 
The answer is once again to be found in The Wealth of Nations. According to Smith, a key role is 
played in determining the conditions of agricultural agreements by ‘the principal produce of land’, 
which he takes to be corn: 
 
[i]n Europe corn is the principal produce of land which serves immediately for human food. Except in 
particular situations, therefore, the rent of corn land regulates in Europe that of all other cultivated 
land [p. 174 – I.xi.b35]. 
 
Once the level of the rent paid on land used for the ‘principal produce’ (corn) is set, competition 
will make the rent per unit of land under every other form of cultivation equal to that in the corn 
sector: 
 
[i]n all great countries the greater part of the cultivated lands are employed in producing either food 
for men or food for cattle. The rent and profit of these regulate the rent and profit of all other 
cultivated land. If any particular produce afforded less, the land would soon be turned into corn or 
pasture; and if any afforded more, some part of the lands in corn or pasture would soon be turned to 
that produce [p. 168 – I.xi.b23]. 
 
The mechanism described by Smith is thus as follows. There is a principal agricultural sector, 
which is (usually, but not necessarily) the sector producing the fundamental element of the human 
diet. It can in fact be assumed, following Smith, that most of the soil in the country is devoted to 
this crop, at least in the case of an almost closed economy. The share of product that forms the rent 
of agricultural soil is established in this sector by bargaining between landowners and tenant 
farmers. Once this is determined, e.g. as one third of the corn harvest according to Smith,10 as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Differences in the fertility of land are ignored here for the sake of simplicity. 
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result of competition, every piece of land must then pay a rent equal to the value of one third of the 
corn that can be grown upon it regardless of its actual use. 
It is within this levelling mechanism that the rate of rent, conceived as the value rent per unit of 
land, has relevance in Smith’s analysis.  
While this point is taken up again in section 5, let us now consider the way in which a tithe, i.e. a 
tax or a rent conceived as a share of output, can be included within Sraffa’s analysis of prices and 
distribution. 
 
 
4. Sraffa and the tithe 
 
In chapter VIII of Production of Commodities (1960), with the aim of elucidating the different roles 
played by basic and non-basic commodities in determining the rate of profit, Sraffa considers the 
effects of a tax levied on the production of a particular commodity ‘as a tithe, which can be defined 
independently of prices’ (Sraffa, 1960, p. 55),11 i.e. a certain share (usually a tenth) of the gross 
output. According to Sraffa: 
 
[a] tax on a basic product then will affect all prices and cause a fall in the rate of profits that 
corresponds to a given wage, while if imposed on a non-basic it will have no effect beyond the price 
of the taxed commodity and those of such other non-basics as may be linked with it [Sraffa, 1960, pp. 
55]. 
 
Being placed at the end of a complex chapter devoted to cases with joint production, this point 
has received little attention.12 We shall therefore present some simple examples here in which a 
given share σ, with 0 < σ < 1, of the gross production of a commodity is paid either to the state as a 
tax, as Sraffa assumed, or to landowners as a rent, as we can also assume.13 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As Sraffa wrote, the different role played by basic and non-basic industries is easy to perceive in the single-products 
system, where a technical improvement in a basic industry would bring about a change in the rate of profits and the 
prices of all commodities, whereas the same improvement in a non-basic sector would not affect the rate of profits but 
only some prices (and perhaps its price alone). This sort of distinction cannot, however, be extended directly to the case 
with joint production because, as Sraffa points out, basic and non-basic commodities may be outputs of the same 
process. He therefore suggests consideration of the effects of a tax on a particular commodity rather than a technical 
improvement. 
12 An in-depth analysis of how Sraffa arrived at using the tithes in order to distinguish basic and non-basic commodities 
in the case of joint production is presented by Kurz and Salvadori (2007). Besides Kurz and Salvadori's essay, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are just a few brief references to this passage of Production of Commodities (e.g. Schefold 
1989, p. 68; Bidard 2004, p. 36) and one attempt at formal representation (Ballesteros et al., 1979, pp. 30-4). 
13 In this respect, Torrens wrote: ‘Tithes have generally been considered as a direct tax upon agriculture. But this is not 
the correct way of viewing them. Rent is correctly defined to be, that portion of the produce which is given to the 
proprietor for the use of the soil. The church, by a title antecedent to any other which can now be shewn, is, to a certain 
extent, a proprietor in common of the lands of the country; and that portion of the produce of land which the cultivator 
pays to the church, for the use of the soil, comes, in strictness, under the definition of rent.’ Torrens, 1827, p. 230, 1. 
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In each example there are just two commodities, one basic and one non-basic. We shall consider 
first a very simple case without joint production and with the tax (or rent) levied on the non-basic 
commodity, then the case with the tax imposed on the basic commodity, and finally the case with 
joint production and different rates of taxation levied on the two commodities. 
 
4.1 Example one 
Let us begin our analysis with a simple case involving two commodities, one basic, commodity [a], 
and one non-basic, commodity [b]. Let σb be the share of the gross output of commodity [b] paid to 
the state as tax or the landowner as rent (as the reader prefers). 
Commodity [a] is the numéraire14 and Sraffa’s assumptions and symbols are adopted for all the 
rest. 
The price equations for the case considered here are: 
 
  
€ 
1= aa (1+ r) +  aw        [1] 
  
€ 
pb = (ab + bbpb)(1+ r) +  bw + σbpb     [2] 
 
The wage-profit relation emerges directly from equation [1] and is therefore not affected by the 
share σb. It follows instead from equation [2] that the price of commodity [b] in terms of [a] 
depends on the tax (or rent) share: 
 
  
€ 
pb =
ab(1+ r) +  bw
1− bb(1+ r) −σb
       [3] 
 
In particular, as clearly emerges from equation [3], pb increases monotonically as σb increases and 
tends to ∞ as σb approaches 1 – bb(1 + r). 
 
4.2 Example two 
In this example, the share σa is paid from the gross output of the basic commodity [a] and no tax or 
rent is paid for the production of the non-basic commodity [b]. 
The price equations for this case are: 
 
  
€ 
1= aa (1+ r) +  aw + σa       [4] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In the three examples, given that commodity [a] is the only basic commodity, it is also the standard commodity. 
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€ 
pb = (ab + bbpb)(1+ r) +  bw       [5] 
 
In the case considered here, as well the one above, the wage-profit relation emerges directly 
from the first equation, equation [4]. It is, however, now affected by the share σa, as we obtain the 
following from equation [4]: 
 
  
€ 
r = 1− aa −  aw −σaaa
.      [6] 
 
It can now be observed that since there are three distribution variables, namely w, r and the share 
σa, two of them will change in the same direction when the third goes in the opposite. At the same 
time, however, when one of the three variables is kept the same, the other two are inversely related. 
In particular, for this case without joint production, we find confirmation of Sraffa’s assertion in the 
passage quoted above: a rise in the share σa brings about a fall in the rate of profits associated with 
a given wage rate. Given a wage rate w’, there is in fact an inverse relationship between the rate of 
profits and the share σa, as emerges clearly from equation [6] and fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1: The relation between r and σa for a given wage rate 
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4.3 Example three 
The third case considered – in which the two commodities, one basic and one non-basic, are 
produced jointly – is the one closest to what Sraffa had in mind in introducing the idea of a tithe.  
Two processes are in use. For a process i, with i = 1, 2, a(i) denotes the amount of commodity [a] 
jointly produced with each unit of [b], and ai and i denote the inputs of commodity [a] and labour 
employed per unit of commodity [b] produced. As before, σa and σb are the shares of tax (or rent) of 
gross output of commodities [a] and [b] respectively. 
The price equations for the case under consideration are thus: 
 
  
€ 
(1−σa )a(1) + (1−σb)pb = a1(1+ r) + 1w      [7] 
  
€ 
(1−σa )a(2) + (1−σb)pb = a2(1+ r) +  2w      [8] 
 
By subtracting equation [8] from equation [7] we obtain: 
 
  
€ 
(1−σa )(a(1) − a(2)) = (a1 − a2)(1+ r) + (1 −  2)w     [9] 
 
and equation [9], properly reorganised, becomes: 
 
  
€ 
r = (1−σa )(a(1) − a(2)) − (a1 − a2) − (1 −  2)w(a1 − a2)
.    [10] 
 
Therefore, as Sraffa wrote, the tax share σb – the one imposed on the non-basic commodity – 
does not affect the wage-profit relation but only the price pb. The wage-profit relation is instead 
influenced by the share σa. The rest of Sraffa’s claim, namely that a rise in the share σa will ‘cause a 
fall in the rate of profits that corresponds to a given wage’, does not, however, appear to be 
generally valid,15 since we shall show at least a case in which this does not happen. 
If the processes are ordered in such a way that (a(1) – a(2)) > 0, three cases are possible: i) (a1 – a2) 
> 0 and (1 – 2) > 0; ii) (a1 – a2) > 0 and (1 – 2) < 0 and iii) (a1 – a2) < 0 and (1 – 2) > 0. There is 
an inverse relationship between w and r, for a given share σa, in the first case, but the relationship is 
direct in the other two. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This point is not noticed in the two papers dealing with Sraffa’s tithe analitically. Ballesteros et al. (1979), in 
particular, focussed their attention on the effects of tax on prices only. Kurz and Salvadori’s analysis (2007) is, instead, 
essentially aimed at verifying the most important part of Sraffa’s claim, i.e. that the tax share imposed on a non-basic 
commodity does not affect the wage-profit relation. 
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While Sraffa’s idea of an inverse relationship between r and σa holds in cases i) and ii), in the 
third, contrary to what he wrote, the rate of profits corresponding to a fixed wage rate increases with 
the rise in the share σa. In fact, given a wage rate w’, equation [10] implies: 
 
  
€ 
r = (a(1) − a(2)) − (a1 − a2) − (1 −  2)w'(a1 − a2)
−
(a(1) − a(2))
(a1 − a2)
σa .   [11] 
 
Therefore, since (a(1) – a(2)) > 0, (a1 – a2) < 0 entails a direct relationship between r and σa, as is 
shown in fig. 2 and in the appendix by means of a numerical example. 
 
Fig. 2. The relation between r and σa, for a give wage rate in the case with joint production 
 
 In	  the	  case	  considered,	  given	  the	  shares	  σa	  and	  σb	  and	  the	  wage	  rate	  w,	  the	  rate	  of	  profits	  –	  together	  with	  the	  price	  pb	  –	  must	  allow	  the	  two	  processes	  to	  coexist.	  Therefore,	  since	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  share	  σa	  is	  more	  disadvantageous	  to	  process	  (1)	  than	  to	  process	  (2)	  –	  because	  process	  (1)	  produces	  a	  greater	  output	  of	  commodity	  [a]	  per	  unit	  of	  [b]	  –	  the	  change	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  profit	  must	  compensate	  this	  disequilibrium.	  Given	  that	  process	  (1)	  employs	  less	  capital	  per	  unit	  of	  output	  of	   commodity	   [b]	   than	  process	   (2),	   i.e.	   a1	  <	  a2,	   the	   rate	  of	  profit	   associated	  with	   the	  same	  wage	  rate	  must	  increase.	  An	  increase	  in	  pb	  can	  also	  be	  expected	  in	  this	  case. 
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5. Rent	  shares	  in	  Sraffa’s	  price	  equations 
 
While cases in which rent shares appear within Sraffa’s equations have already been studied in the 
previous section, there are a few further points to be considered. This will be done here by means of 
a simple example. 
Let us consider a system in which it is assumed for simplicity that there are two natural means of 
production, namely agricultural land and mines. The former can be used for two different types of 
produce, say apples and barley, and the latter produce coal. As is usual in the study of rent, the 
presence is also assumed of a ‘pure industrial product’, namely a commodity, say dishes, whose 
production requires neither land nor mines. 
In accordance with the notation introduced in the previous section, σa, σb and σc are the fractions 
of the gross production of apples, barley and coal paid as rent. Adopting the usual notation for the 
other magnitudes and assuming that wages and rents are paid post-factum, we can write the 
following equations: 
 
  
€ 
pa = (aapa + bapb + capc + dapd )(1+ r) +  aw + σapa     [12] 
  
€ 
pb = (abpa + bbpb + cbpc + dbpd )(1+ r) +  bw + σbpb     [13] 
  
€ 
pc = (acpa + bcpb + ccpc + dcpd )(1+ r) +  cw + σcpc     [14] 
  
€ 
pd = (adpa + bdpb + cdpc + ddpd )(1+ r) +  dw .    [15] 
 
If the three shares σa, σb and σc can be regarded as given, then no new unknown has been added 
to Sraffa’s usual system of equations and therefore no new analytical problem arises. Once a 
numéraire is adopted, say dishes, and the wage rate is known, the system [12]–[15] can determine 
the prices pa, pb and pc in terms of dishes together with the rate of profits r. 
The share σc is, however, unquestionably independent of σa and σb, as we cannot grow apples or 
barley in a coal mine or, normally, extract coal from agricultural soil (while coal could be produced 
from wood, this possibility is overlooked here), but σa and σb could instead be linked to one 
another.  
If λa and λb are the areas of agricultural land needed to obtain one unit of apples and one unit of 
barley respectively, and if σa and σb are arbitrarily given, then the land employed in the apple sector 
receives a rent per acre of , which is generally different from the rent for land devoted to 
the production of barley 
€ 
σbpb λb . Therefore, if there is no qualitative difference between the land 
employed in the two sectors, it is in the landowners’ interest, as Adam Smith pointed out, to lease 
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their land only in the sector that pays the higher rate of rent. And this fact, together with the 
classical mechanism of competition among producers, would bring the rates of rent to equality in 
both sectors, that is: 
 .	   	   	   	   	   	   [16] 
 
When this equation is added to the system [12]–[15],16 one of the two shares σa and σb becomes 
an unknown to be determined.17 Following Smith’s analysis as presented in section 3, we can 
assume that one of the two crops, say apples, is the principal agricultural product of the economy. 
In this case, the rent of land devoted to apple growing regulates the rent of all the other cultivated 
land and σb is therefore a variable to be determined simultaneously with relative prices and the rate 
of profits by the system [12]–[16], in which we take as given the technical coefficients, the wage 
rate and the shares σa and σc. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In many parts of their works, the classical economists refer to rent as a share of the gross output 
of land or mines. This was indeed, as argued in section 2, the way in which rent was conceived in 
the world that they observed (and that can still be observed in many cases today). 
In section 3, where Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is taken as representative of this approach 
to rent analysis, it is shown that different rent shares can be paid for the use of different natural 
resources: agricultural soil, coal mines, tin mines, etc. It is also shown that in the case of 
agricultural soil, as different crops can be grown on it, the relevant rent share, according to Smith, 
must be referred to the principal agricultural product, which is assumed in his analysis to be corn. 
Given the fraction of gross production of corn paid as rent, every piece of land, regardless of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 It is also possible to use equation [16] directly within the system, substituting σb with σapaλb/λa in equation [13]. 
17 The point can be put in terms even closer to the Ricardian (and neo-Ricardian) approach to rent. The cultivation of 
apples and barley can be viewed as two different production activities simultaneously under way on land of the same 
quality. Now, if land of this quality is fully employed, the rate of rent must be such as to allow the two processes to 
coexist, which means in our framework that not only the price equations but also condition [16] must be satisfied. 
Therefore, as the coexistence of two processes side by side on the same kind of land determines the intensive rent in the 
case considered by Sraffa (1960, pp. 75, 76), so here one of the two rent shares is endogenously determined. 
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actual use, must provide the landowner with rent equal in value to that it would fetch in the corn 
sector. 
The ideas found in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations are used in section 5 to include the rent 
shares for the use of natural resources in Sraffa’s price equations. In particular, it is seen that once 
the rent shares are taken as given, the resulting system is essentially analogous to the one 
considered by Sraffa. The only possible further complication is represented by the endogenous 
determination of the rent shares for crops other than the principal one. 
The compatibility of this way of conceiving rent with the theory presented in Production of 
Commodities is also demonstrated by the case of a tax in the form of a tithe – i.e. as a share of gross 
output – that Sraffa addressed very briefly in his book. Since little analysis exists on this case, some 
possible examples are put forward and discussed in section 4, where it is discovered that Sraffa’s 
claim that ‘a tax on a basic product then will […] cause a fall in the rate of profits that correspond to 
a given wage’ (p. 55) holds in almost all the cases considered even though, as we have shown, it is 
also possible – and precisely in the case with joint production that Sraffa refers to in the said 
passage – that the rate of profit increases when the tax share rises for a given wage rate. 
In conclusion, we believe there are still many aspects and issues connected with the conception 
of rent as a share of the gross output of the commodities obtained by the use of natural resources 
that are not taken into consideration here in order to avoid the introduction of too many arguments 
all at once. Possibilities include reformulating the differential rent theory – especially with 
reference to mining rents – in terms of shares and using the conception of rent as a given share in 
order to include rents other than the differential ones18 within Sraffa’s price equations.  
 
 
Appendix: a numerical example 
 
The following numerical example is presented here with the aim of clarifying the result showed in 
sec. 4.3 as regards the possibility, in the case of joint production, of a direct relation between the 
rent share on a basic output and the rate of profits associated with a given wage rate. 
Let us assume the following system of production: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 On this point, see also Fratini (2008) and, in particular, (2012). 
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Tab. 1 – Technical coefficients 
  INPUTS  OUTPUTS 
  commodity [a] labour  commodity [a] commodity [b] 
Activity 1  2 20 → 10 1 
Activity 2  5 10 → 9 1 
 
In this case, with commodity [a] as the numéraire, the price equations are: 
 
€ 
(1−σa )10+ (1−σb )pb = 2(1+ r)+ 20w     [a.1] 
€ 
(1−σa )9+ (1−σb )pb = 5(1+ r)+10w     [a.2] 
 
Therefore, by subtracting equation [a.2] from equation [a.1], we obtain: 
 
€ 
1−σa = −3(1+ r)+10w .     [a.3] 
 
Two remarks can be made on equation [a.3]. First, as is well known, a direct rather than inverse 
relationship between w and r can emerge when commodities are jointly produced, and this is 
exactly what happens in the case we are considering. From equation [a.3], assuming σa = 0, we 
have: 
 
€ 
w = 4 + 3r10 .      [a.4] 
 
and w = 0.4 is therefore the minimum wage rate compatible with the coexistence of the two 
production activities if σa = 0. 
Second, given a wage rate, say w = 0.41, equation [a.3] brings about a direct relation between r 
and σa: 
 
      [a.5] 
 
which corresponds to the red straight line in fig. 2. 
The levels of the rate of profits and the price of commodity [b] in terms of [a] associated to 
different rent shares σa – with w = 0.41 and σb = 0 – are shown in tab. 2. 
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Tab. 2 – Rate of profits and price pb associated to different rent shares σa  
(with w = 0.41 and σb = 0) 
σa	   0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 
r 0,03 0,07 0,10 0,13 0,17 0,20 0,23 0,27 0,30 0,33 0,37 
pb 0,27 1,33 2,40 3,47 4,53 5,60 6,67 7,73 8,80 9,87 10,93 
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